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Compensatory and punitive awards were created to serve two separate and 
distinct purposes: to compensate the plaintiff for his/her injuries and to punish the 
defendant for negligent conduct, respectively. Thus, defendant characteristics should 
have no impact on compensatory award decisions. Extensive research, however, 
indicates that these extra-legal factors do impact damage awards. The purpose of this 
study was to examine whether varying types of judicial instructions could be used to 
reduce the effects o f such extra-legal considerations, particularly a defendant’s status as 
an individual or a corporation and defendant reprehensibility. As hypothesized, 
participants awarded larger compensatory awards in high reprehensibility conditions than 
in low reprehensibility conditions. There was also a trend to award larger sums of money 
when the defendant was a corporation rather than an individual. However, none o f the 
four levels o f judicial instructions were shown to counter the impact o f either extra-legal 
consideration.
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Countering the Consideration of Extra-Legal 
Factors in Damage Award Decisions 
There has been extensive controversy concerning the intricacies o f juror decision­
making. One area of focus in that controversy has been civil damage awards. Many 
argue that this is an area in which jurors are allowed too much latitude and must make 
important decisions based upon ambiguous instructions. In addition to producing great 
variation among award amounts, such ambiguity leaves these award decisions open to the 
effects o f extra-legal influences. There is an abundance of evidence demonstrating that 
jurors consider extra-legal factors when making damage award decisions (Wasserman & 
Robinson, 1980; Hans & Ermann, 1989; MacCoun, 1996).
As defined by the legal system, compensatory damages are intended to 
compensate the plaintiff for any suffered losses. The purpose of this type of award is to 
bring the plaintiff back to the place where he/she was before the accident. Therefore, 
this type o f award should be based solely on the degree of injuries suffered by the 
plaintiff. Defendant characteristics should have no impact on the amount of the 
compensatory award. Ideally, two similar plaintiffs who suffered from similar injuries 
would receive similar compensatory damage awards independent of the identity or status 
o f the defendant. The same accident, leading to the same injuries, should theoretically 
produce the same compensatory damages across defendants. This means that similar 
damages should be awarded regardless of factors such as, whether the defendant is a 
corporation or an individual, the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, or the 
defendant’s ability to pay a large sum.
Punitive damages, on the other hand, are intended to serve as punishment for 
wantonly negligent or reckless behavior. This type o f damages should consider only the 
conduct and characteristics o f the defendant and should ignore the needs and 
characteristics of the plaintiff. The severity of the plaintiffs injuries should have no
l
impact on the amount o f the punitive award. Therefore, if defendant conduct is held 
constant across cases then punitive award amounts should be the same, independent of 
the plaintiffs needs or injuries.
In spite of the legal distinction between the two types of damage awards and their 
differing purposes, jurors generally receive little or no instruction as to how damage 
award decisions should be made. Typically, jurors receive no guidelines as to what 
factors are appropriate or inappropriate to consider. This study examines whether 
additional instructions lead to more legally sound award decisions. Specifically, do 
additional instructions that explicitly state what factors are to be considered when making 
such decisions reduce the jurors consideration of extra-legal factors? The extra-legal 
factors examined in this experiment are defendant status as a corporation or an individual 
and the reprehensibility o f the defendant’s conduct.
Chin and Peterson (1985) questioned whether justice is actually blind to factors 
not related to the case in question. The researchers examined verdict data for over 9,000 
civil cases in Cook County, Illinois. Their purpose was to determine if, in reality, there 
are plaintiffs that are more likely to win (irresistible plaintiffs) or defendants that are 
more likely to have large damage awards levied against them (deep pocket defendants). 
The deep pocket theory proposes that jurors award larger amounts against defendants that 
appear to have more money. Therefore, simply because a defendant has a greater ability 
to pay, he will be required to pay larger amounts. Until this point, the idea that such 
factors impacted verdicts and damage awards had been liberally claimed, but not 
empirically tested.
Based on the Cook County data, Chin and Peterson (1985) did find evidence for 
the deep pocket effect. Amounts awarded against corporations were higher than those 
awarded against individuals. The authors, however, did point out that the cases involving 
corporate defendants also differed from the cases involving individual defendants on
other dimensions. Corporate defendants were more likely to be involved in high stakes 
cases and cases with multiple defendants. Using statistical analyses to control for those 
factors, a corporate/individual difference was still found. Damage awards were higher 
against corporations when the plaintiff suffered injuries that were not severe, but in cases 
o f severe injuries the difference became much larger.
A regression model based on the verdict data collected in Cook County, Illinois, 
was developed by Hammitt, Carol, and Relies (1985). This model predicts strong 
differences in award amounts between suits filed against corporations and suits filed 
against individuals. After taking injury and case type into account, the authors predict 
that awards against corporations will be 34 percent larger than awards against 
individuals. This difference is even more pronounced in cases in which the plaintiff 
suffers severe and permanent injuries. In these instances, awards against corporations are 
predicted to be 4.5 times higher than awards against individuals.
As is previously summarized, past research in this area has focused on the 
examination of archival data. Though useful, such examinations do not provide 
experimenters with the control available in laboratory research. One difficulty 
encountered in using procedures involving archival data is the inability to equivocate the 
cases. An experimental design allows the experimenter to control all aspects of the case 
and manipulate only the identity of the defendant. Actual cases, on the other hand, will 
rarely be so clean-cut. In addition to defendant identity, many other case-unique 
characteristics are introduced. The abundance of such additional characteristics render it 
difficult to detect what factors are actually causing the differences and dangerous to draw 
too many conclusions based on archival data
Vidmar (1994) warns experimenters of just such errors. Although data of this 
type provides certain useful information, Vidmar (1994) suggests that experimenters 
resist being drawn to archival data merely because it pertains to “real” cases. The author
warns o f the numerous dangers involved in relying solely on research o f archival data. 
Not only is it impossible to eliminate alternate hypotheses, but often cases from different 
jurisdictions differ on so many dimensions that the cases are no longer even comparable. 
These problems underscore the need for laboratory research demonstrating the same 
corporate/individual difference found in archival data.
Wasserman and Robinson (1980) conducted a laboratory study examining this 
issue. The authors were interested in the effects of nonevidentary influences, particularly 
defendant identity and type of evidence, on damage awards. The experimenters asked 
participants to award damages in a case in which the defendant was described either as an 
average man earning about $30,000 a year, or an average corporation with assets of about 
$2 million. After making individual award decisions, participants were placed into 
groups and asked to deliberate and reach a group award decision. Both individual and 
group mean awards were higher against the corporate defendant than against the 
individual defendant.
A caveat to the authors’ conclusions must be noted. The description in the 
individual condition contained the information that the individual did not have an 
insurance policy. No such information was given for the corporate defendant. Both 
defendant status and insurance coverage or lack thereof are extra-legal influences and 
neither should theoretically affect award decisions. For this reason, the evidence does 
demonstrate that mock jurors are considering extra-legal factors when making their 
decisions. However, it can not be concluded from this study that the large differences in 
award amounts are due to a difference in defendant status, as the author asserts, rather 
than to the issue o f insurance coverage.
An interest in examining differences in public attitudes concerning corporate and 
individual wrongdoing led Hans and Ermann (1989) to conduct a study that lends support 
to the corporate versus individual bias. The authors constructed two scenarios describing
workers who developed illnesses after being contracted to perform a job. As a result the 
workers brought legal action against the party that hired them. The scenarios were 
identical except for the identity of the defendant. Half of the participants received 
scenarios in which the defendant was Mr. Jones, the other half, the Jones Corporation. 
Participants were asked to determine liability, damages, and criminal negligence.
Findings in all three categories supported a bias against corporations (Hans & 
Ermann, 1989). The Jones Corporation was significantly more likely to be found liable 
for plaintiff injuries. Once liability had been established, larger damage awards were 
awarded against the corporate defendant than the individual defendant. This difference 
was particularly large for pain and suffering damages, which is the category in which 
jurors have the most freedom in their award decision. In addition, Mr. Jones was much 
less likely then the Jones Corporation to be voted as criminally negligent.
Further attitudinal questions revealed that participants regarded lawsuits against 
the corporation as both more fair and more reasonable than the lawsuits against the 
individual. Criminal charges were also viewed as more fair when they were brought 
against the Jones Corporation than when they were filed against Mr. Jones. Participants 
rated the degree of harm suffered by the workers as the same across groups, but perceived 
the actions o f the corporate defendant as much more sinister than the actions o f the 
individual defendant. The corporate defendant was found to be “more reckless, more 
morally wrong, and more deserving of punishment” than the individual defendant (Hans 
& Ermann, 1989, p. 158). Corporations were also rated as more likely to have previously 
been aware of the dangers, less regretful after the incident, and less likely to change their 
behavior in the future.
These findings indicate that award discrepancy between corporate and individual 
defendants is due to something more intricate than the defendant’s ability to pay. 
Although the corporation was seen as having a greater ability to pay awarded damages,
this was far from the only difference found between the two defendants (Hans & Ermann, 
1989). The fact that the corporation was generally viewed in a more negative light than 
the individual, despite the fact that all case characteristics were identical, suggests that 
the public has a much harsher opinion of corporate wrongdoing than of individual 
wrongdoing. These findings led the authors to speculate that much more than a deep 
pockets phenomenon was occurring. The authors propose that jurors hold corporations to 
a higher standard than individuals and as a result have a more negative view of corporate 
wrongdoing. This less lenient attitude toward corporations then leads to higher damage 
awards against corporate defendants.
MacCoun (1996) purports that a flaw in the studies designed to test the deep 
pocket hypothesis is the confound of defendant wealth and defendant identity. It is 
reasonable to assume that jurors may perceive corporations as more wealthy than 
individuals. For that reason, monetary judgments against corporations may be higher 
based on a higher perceived ability to pay rather than as a result of a bias against 
corporate defendants. This idea is consistent with the deep pocket hypothesis. MacCoun 
(1996) points out that studies that merely compare corporations and individuals cannot 
eliminate the possibility that the award disparity may be a sole function o f perceived 
wealth or ability to pay. On the other hand, the disparity may be independent of 
defendant wealth and be attributable to differing perceptions of corporations and 
individuals.
In a study designed to further test the deep pockets phenomenon, MacCoun 
(1996) examines whether the noted differences are actually due to the wealth o f the 
defendant, as the deep pocket theory would suggest, or instead to the individual/corporate 
distinction. In an effort to eliminate this confound, MacCoun (1996) created a design that 
included three defendant conditions: a blue-collar individual, a wealthy individual, and a 
corporate defendant. Defendant descriptions for the wealthy individual and the corporate
defendant held all characteristics constant except the name of the defendant. For 
example, one case described the defendants as a construction worker (blue-collar 
defendant), the owner of a “construction contracting business with many concurrent 
projects and a large crew of construction workers” (wealthy individual defendant), or a 
corporation that is a “construction contracting business with many concurrent projects 
and a large crew of construction workers” (corporate defendant) (MacCoun, 1996).
Controlling for defendant wealth, MacCoun (1996) found that mock jurors still 
gave larger damage awards when the defendant was a corporation, rather than an 
individual. This bias against corporations occurred even when the individual was 
described as a wealthy individual with the same assets as the corporation. These findings 
are not consistent with the deep pocket hypothesis, which has previously been used to 
explain the corporate versus individual award differential. If the award decisions were 
guided by the defendant’s ability to pay then the judgments against the corporate 
defendant and the wealthy individual should be both comparable and significantly higher 
than the judgments against the blue-collar individual. Instead, as was the trend in past 
research, similar judgments were awarded to the individual defendants with higher 
judgments awarded against the corporation.
An empirical examination by Vidmar (1995) did not produce results consistent 
with the archival analyses or the previous research in this area. His experiment was 
designed to test the notion that medical malpractice cases are somehow treated differently 
than other types of cases and that this difference is attributable to the perceived “deep 
pockets” of insurance companies. Vidmar (1995) assigned participants to read either a 
malpractice or automobile negligence case that had either one defendant, two defendants, 
or a corporate defendant. He found no differences in mean award amounts between 
groups.
It is uncertain why Vidmar’s (1995) findings were not consistent with past
research. Due to the medical malpractice focus of Vidmar’s (1995) study, the case 
descriptions were somewhat different than the scenarios used in the previously cited 
studies. These differences may have somehow influenced award amounts. In the 
corporate conditions, the cases depended on the legal doctrine of vicarious liability in 
which employers are responsible for the actions of their employees. Additionally, the 
cases were such that in the individual conditions, the defendants actually committed a 
negligent act. The injuries were not due to improper corporate policies, but rather due 
solely to the actions o f the individual. Therefore, it was not actually the corporation that 
committed the injurious act, although the corporation was legally responsible for it.
Under these circumstances, it is not terribly difficult to imagine that the previously 
documented difference may be alleviated by a desire to award larger damages against a 
defendant that directly committed the act and less against a corporation that was 
indirectly responsible for it. However, the award differences found by MacCoun (1996) 
were consistent across six different cases, some of which involved the issue of vicarious 
liability.
There could be numerous reasons why damage award decisions against 
corporations are higher than those against individuals. As suggested by Hans and 
Ermann (1989), the difference could be attributable to corporations being held to a higher 
standard. The attribution theory can account for such a difference in standard. A 
corporation is composed of a number of people. A group of people, due to their 
collective resources, may be expected to have greater foresight about such matters than 
an individual (Hans & Ermann, 1989). Additionally, it may be easier for jurors to award 
large damages against corporations because it is a more impersonal entity than an 
individual (MacCoun, 1996). Along the same lines, Hammitt et al. (1985) suggests that 
jurors may be balancing the good that the money will do the plaintiff against the harm 
that paying the awarded amount will do to the defendant. It may be easier for jurors to
perceive the award as harmful when it is against an individual than when it is against a 
corporation.
Regardless of the reason behind this effect, the defendant’s status as a corporation 
or individual is a factor that has been shown to be a consideration for the purposes o f 
awarding compensatory damages. As previously stated, this runs counter to the legal 
purpose of compensatory damages. Compensatory damages should be based solely on 
the plaintiffs injuries and suffering and should not be influenced by defendant 
characteristics.
It is also important to perform a conceptual replication of these findings using a 
different characteristic to ensure that these results are not due to something unique in the 
corporation/individual characteristic. Another extra-legal factor that may affect damage 
award decisions is defendant reprehensibility Cather, Greene, and Durham (1996) 
designed a study to investigate whether jurors were basing their damage award decisions 
on the appropriate legal factors. The experiment examined the effects o f plaintiff injury 
and defendant reprehensibility on award decisions. In accordance with legal doctrine, 
plaintiff injury should impact compensatory damages, but not punitive damages. The 
opposite trend should be true for defendant reprehensibility; reprehensibility should affect 
punitive awards, but not compensatory awards. Participants were given brief instructions 
as to the purpose of each type of damages. Although Cather et al. (1996) did not find a 
significant difference between awards for high versus low reprehensibility o f defendants, 
there was a definite trend in that direction. Across three cases, the mean award amount 
for highly reprehensible defendants was $413,000 as opposed to $196,000 for less 
reprehensible defendants.
Further evidence in this regard is provided by Wissler, Evans, Hart, Morry, and 
Saks (1997). Wissler et al. (1997) examined how fault attributions affected pain and 
suffering awards. The authors manipulated the degree of defendant fault and found
marginally significant differences (p=.067) for pain and suffering awards between groups 
across the five case scenarios. In addition, for one of the five cases, there were strong 
differences between award amounts for very responsible versus less responsible 
defendants (p< 001). This indicates that weaker findings may be due to weaker 
manipulations or factors specific to the given case summary.
The Hans and Ermann (1989) experiment also lends support to the notion that 
defendant reprehensibility influences compensatory award decisions. The authors assert 
that these differences may be due to corporations being held to a higher standard than 
individuals. Based on this standard, identical actions may be considered more reckless 
when committed by a corporation than by an individual. Consistent with that idea, the 
conditions in which mock jurors awarded high damages were also the conditions in 
which the respondents considered the defendant to be most reckless.
Consideration of the evidence indicates that despite what is legally intended, 
extra-legal factors do play a role in damage award decisions. An interesting question 
then becomes, “How can such considerations be countered?” As has been previously 
stated, jurors are placed into a role in which they are asked to make extremely important 
decisions, but are given very little guidance. Guidance as to what should or should not be 
considered when making damage decisions is a matter dealing with juror education and 
bias reduction. This information could be presented with ease through judicial 
instructions, which are routinely used to inform and educate jurors about various legal 
matters.
The traditional method of dealing with factors that jurors are not supposed to 
consider has been to not mention or to ignore those factors. In certain instances, this is a 
legitimate method of bias reduction. Courts routinely withhold information from, or 
blindfold, juries as a means of reducing bias. Not informing jurors of a defendant’s past 
criminal record is an example of blindfolding for that purpose. In this example, a bias
would be very likely if the jurors were given that information and blindfolding is a 
logical answer. The problem, however, arises when the idea of not addressing a bias is 
applied in situations in which ignoring the bias does not eliminate it. There are some 
circumstances in which it would be more beneficial to stop ignoring that jurors may 
consider particular factors and instead instruct them otherwise. Not telling a jury whether 
a defendant in a motor vehicle accident suit carried insurance is an example of 
problematic blindfolding. This information is not given to jurors because it is a factor 
that is not supposed to be considered. However, if the matter at hand is something about 
which jurors already have established beliefs or expectations, then blindfolding is 
unlikely to serve its intended purpose (Diamond & Casper, 1992). In this case, it is 
understandable that jurors may assume that the defendant has insurance though he or she 
may not. It is also understandable that this assumption may influence jurors damage 
award decisions. This illustrates the importance of recognizing and dealing with any 
biases that will not be corrected for by simply not addressing those issues with the jurors.
The consideration of extra-legal factors in award decisions has not been 
eliminated by ignoring it. Jurors must be informed that such considerations are 
inappropriate. In addition, explaining to jurors the purpose of each type of damages and 
the reasons that certain factors should not be considered should lead to better compliance 
with the instructions than mere admonitions not to consider those factors (Diamond & 
Casper, 1992).
Furthermore, in order for jurors to follow judicial instructions, the instructions 
must be clearly written. Clarity o f judicial instructions has been studied across many 
legal specters. Juror’s lack of understanding of judicial instructions has been evidenced 
in various legal circumstances. Jurors have been shown to be unclear as to the degree of 
certainty that is required by the reasonable doubt standard even after receiving specific 
judicial instructions (Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996). Additionally, Reifman, Gusick,
and Ellsworth (1992) found that jurors understood less than half of the instructions they 
were given. It is therefore evident why such variation in juror decision-making exists. It 
is also evident that jurors are in need of clear, concise instructions. This study attempts to 
reduce award variation and consideration of extra-legal factors by providing jurors with 
brief, yet concise instructions concerning what should and should not be considered in 
compensatory damage award decisions.
The literature has also speculated as to the effects of including specific examples 
injudicial instructions. In particular, the death qualification literature raises the concern 
that if jurors are given a list of mitigators, they may interpret the listed mitigators as the 
only mitigators they are allowed to consider. This concern also arises when constructing 
judicial instructions as to what may and may not be considered when awarding civil 
damages. This study incorporates this concern into the design by creating two conditions 
that list examples. In one example condition, one of the factors that is being examined 
(corporate/individual status) will be included as an example in the list, but the other 
factor (defendant reprehensibility) will not The other example condition will be the 
opposite. Defendant reprehensibility will be included as an example in the list, but 
corporate/individual status will not. All other examples in the list will remain the same.
Additionally, the two variations of the example condition are needed to ensure 
that the instructions are not having an undesired effect. It is possible that listing factors, 
such as defendant’s corporate status, may make that factor more salient and thus increase 
the chances that it will influence decision-making. This would result in an even greater 
disparity in awards between the two types of defendants. By creating two example 
conditions, one in which the defendant’s status is given and one in which it is not, this 
possibility can be examined and ruled out.
The purpose of this study is to examine whether differing types of judicial 
instructions can reduce the differences in damage awards that result from the
consideration of extra-legal factors. Consistent with past studies, it is expected that both 
corporate status of the defendant and defendant reprehensibility will influence 
compensatory and punitive award decisions. Four levels of instruction (pattern 
instructions, expanded instructions, and expanded instructions with examples including 
or not including the factor in question) will be incorporated to determine whether judicial 
instructions can counter the disparity in compensatory awards.
The pattern instructions typically given to jurors in civil cases, do not provide 
clear instruction as to what information may be employed in damage award decisions.
As a result, jurors must make their decisions based on the information that they are given 
which has been shown to result in the improper consideration of extra-legal factors. It is 
understandable that in the face of unclear or confusing instructions, jurors would rely on 
what they know, primarily that the defendant’s conduct was atrocious or that the 
defendant is a large or wealthy corporation. Expanding on judicial instructions should 
provide jurors with a better framework of how their decisions should be made and as 
such, redirect their attention to the allowed and pertinent considerations. As the 
framework becomes more clear and detailed, the reliance on extra-legal information 
should be lessened. Therefore, with each increase in instruction clarity, a reduction in 
extra-legal considerations is expected. Based on the previously mentioned evidence, the 
expected findings are as follows.
Hypothesis I: Extra-legal factors, such as corporate/individual status and 
defendant reprehensibility, will impact compensatory damage awards when no 
judicial instructions not to consider those factors are given.
Hypothesis 2: Expanded instructions as to the purpose of each type of damages 
are not sufficiently clear and will not be effective in eliminating the consideration 
of extra-legal factors in damage award decisions.
Hypothesis 3: The addition of examples to the expanded instructions will provide
more clear and concise instruction for jurors and will reduce the consideration of 
extra-legal factors in damage award decisions. This will occur regardless of 
whether the extra-legal factors present in the case scenario are listed in the 
example list.
Method
Participants
With the help of the Broward County clerk, one hundred eighty-two volunteers 
were recruited from the jury pool in Broward County, Florida between January, 2000 and 
March, 2000. Fifty-two percent of the participants were male, 79% Caucasian, 10% 
Hispanic, and 10% African American. The median age of the sample was 50-59 and the 
median annual household income was $45,000-$60,000.
Materials and Design
This experiment incorporated a 2 X 2 X 4 (Corporate Status X Reprehensibility X 
Instruction Type) between-subjects, fully-crossed design in which each participant 
received one level o f each independent variable The survey consisted of a civil case 
summary followed by a brief questionnaire. The summary described a personal injury 
civil court case in which an individual was injured when a shelf collapsed on him as he 
was browsing in a hardware store (see Appendix A). The materials included the 
information that a determination of liability had been made. This information was 
followed by a request to award compensatory and punitive damages based upon the 
information provided in the summary. Judge’s instructions were given to guide the 
participants in their decision-making. As is the practice in actual cases, the survey 
allowed the participants to award compensatory damages in individual categories. The 
four compensatory award categories included in this experiment were as follows: 
medical expenses, loss of wages, pain and suffering, and loss of capacity for the 
enjoyment o f life. This was followed by an opportunity to award punitive damages.
Attached was a two-page questionnaire composed of 9-point Likert scale-type opinion 
and attitude items concerning the case and the litigants followed by a basic demographic 
questionnaire (see Appendix C).
All information concerning the plaintiff, the incident in question, and the injuries 
sustained remained constant across conditions. The case scenarios between conditions 
differed on three dimensions: the status of the defendant (corporation or individual), the 
degree o f defendant reprehensibility, and the type of judicial instructions. Half of the 
respondents received a summary in which the defendant was identified as Mr. Maxwell. 
The other half of the participants received questionnaires that identified the defendant as 
Maxwell Corporation. There were two reprehensibility levels, high and low, which were 
manipulated by altering the defendant’s pre-accident conduct (what precautions were 
taken, what policies were held and followed, etc.).
The manipulation of judge’s instructions was divided into four levels (see 
Appendix B). The first level provided basic judicial instructions with no instructions as 
to what could and could not be considered when determining damage awards. These 
instructions were taken from the pattern instructions that jurors are currently given in this 
type o f case and as such served as a baseline as to the information on which jurors are 
currently basing their award decisions. In addition to the information given in the first 
level of instructions, the second level provided more in-depth guidelines as to what were 
proper and improper considerations for each type of damage award. However, this level 
of instruction gave no examples of those considerations. The third and fourth levels 
provided the pattern instructions from the first level, the in-depth guidelines from the 
second level, and gave examples of what type of considerations were inappropriate. One 
of the example levels included whether the defendant was a corporation or individual as 
an example in the example list, but did not include defendant reprehensibility. Likewise, 
the other example level included defendant reprehensibility as an example in the example
list, but did not include corporate status of the defendant.
Procedure
The experimenter was allowed to recruit participants from the excess 
venirepersons that remained in the jury pool at the end of each day. Participants were 
advised that a study was being conducted for educational purposes and that the goal of 
the study was to examine jury decision-making, particularly in civil cases. They were 
informed that their participation was completely voluntary and were told that they would 
be asked to read a civil case summary, award damages based upon that summary, and 
complete a short questionnaire. Participants were randomly assigned to groups (with 11- 
13 persons in each group) and given a complete questionnaire. After completing the 
questionnaire, participants were allowed to ask the experimenter questions and when any 
questions had been answered, participants were thanked and excused.
Results
Compensatory damage award data was analyzed using a 2 X 2 X 4 (Corporation 
X Reprehensibility X Instruction Type) analysis of variance (ANOVA). As was 
previously stated, the compensatory damage awards were broken down into four 
categories. For the purpose of analysis, those categories were summed to form a total 
compensatory award which was used as the dependent measure. The analysis 
demonstrated a significant main effect for defendant reprehensibility (F=5.826, p<01), 
with a mean compensatory award for high reprehensibility (M=$706,164.30) 
significantly higher than the mean compensatory award for low reprehensibility 
(M=$420,294.03). There was also a marginal main effect for status as a corporation or 
individual (F=3.174, p<.077), with a mean compensatory award for corporate defendants 
(M=$668,731.06) higher than the mean compensatory award for individual defendants 
(M=$457,727.27)(see Appendix D). There was no main effect for instruction type and no 
interactions were significant.
A 2 X 2 X 4  (Corporation X Reprehensibility X Instruction Type) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was also used to analyze punitive damage awards. As in the 
compensatory analysis, there was a significant main effect for defendant reprehensibility, 
F=8.293, p<.005, with a mean punitive award for high reprehensibility (M=$559,930.87) 
significantly higher than the mean punitive award for low reprehensibility 
(M=$27,357.96). In addition, the main effect for defendant’s status as a corporation or 
individual was also significant, F=4.203, p< 042, with a mean punitive award for 
corporate defendants (M=$483,210.23) higher than the mean punitive award for 
individual defendants (M=$104,078.60)(see Appendix D). Again, no main effects for 
instruction type were found. This analysis did demonstrate a marginally significant 
Corporation X Reprehensibility interaction, F=3 .234, p<074. No other interactions were 
significant.
Discussion
As expected, both the defendant’s status as a corporation or an individual and the 
degree o f defendant reprehensibility were shown to effect punitive damage awards. 
Punitive awards were higher when the defendant was a corporation as opposed to an 
individual. Higher awards were also given against more reprehensible defendants as 
opposed to less reprehensible defendants. The highest mean punitive awards were 
awarded when the defendant was identified as a corporation whose conduct was highly 
reprehensible. This demonstrates that mock jurors are considering defendant 
characteristics when making punitive award decisions. This is consistent with the legally 
intended purpose of punitive awards, which is to punish defendants for negligent conduct. 
It is both a reasonable and a desirable effect to see that defendants who act in a more 
reprehensible manner will be punished with higher damage awards.
However, the results also indicate that mock jurors also consider these defendant 
characteristics when awarding compensatory damages. This finding is not consistent
with the legally intended purpose of compensatory awards, which is solely to make the 
plaintiff whole again. Participants awarded higher compensatory damages when the 
defendant was a corporation rather than an individual, and when the defendant’s actions 
were highly reprehensible. In essence, the mock jurors seem to be using both types of 
damages to punish the defendants for the incident. This occurred even in conditions in 
which the mock jurors received instructions not to consider defendant characteristics and 
were given those specific characteristics as examples of improper considerations. None 
o f the instructions employed corrected for jurors’ extra-legal considerations.
These results indicate that jurors tend to consider the same factors when making 
each type of award decision, despite the fact that the categories of damages were created 
to serve separate purposes. Judicial instructions did not correct this problem -  a finding 
that is not surprising in the light of judicial instruction research in the areas of pretrial 
publicity and instructions to ignore inadmissible evidence. It still appears that jurors 
either do not understand or choose to ignore the differing purposes of each type of award 
and what factors they should consider when making each award decision. It is possible 
that the instructions were not carefully read or did not provide sufficiently clear 
explanations as to how the decisions should be made. As an oversight of the 
experimenter, instruction comprehension was not measured. For this reason, it is not 
possible to determine whether the participants even read the instructions, much less 
understood and attempted to follow them. It would be interesting to examine whether 
more in-depth instructions could succeed in clarifying jurors’ misunderstandings in this 
regard.
It was hypothesized in this experiment that if jurors understood that the two types 
of damages were developed to serve separate purposes and thus were made to be based 
on separate considerations, then they would be more likely to make more legally sound 
decisions. This hypothesis was based on the intuitive, yet empirically unfounded premise
that education on the law would lead to a higher standard in upholding the law.
However, contrary to the previous optimism of the experimenter, judicial instructions 
have not been shown to have considerable impact injury decision-making.
Another explanation for the failure of judicial instructions to have an effect may 
be seen by examining the type of task the jurors are asked to perform. It is generally 
accepted that jurors take their duty very seriously and are quite motivated to make the 
right decision. However, by asking jurors to fully compartmentalize these two award 
types and maintain full control over what aspects of the case affect their decision-making, 
the courts may be asking jurors to complete a task that simply is not within human 
abilities. If that is the case and it is impossible for persons to set such clear mental 
boundaries as to what influences their decisions, then regardless of instruction clarity, the 
consideration of extra-legal factors will not be eliminated.
Judicial instructions are the most plausible method available to correct for extra- 
legal considerations. Studies incorporating a stronger manipulation of judicial 
instructions can determine whether that method will be fruitful. Further studies are 
needed to determine if it is indeed possible to correct for the consideration of such 
factors. Allowing attorney’s an extended voir dire in an attempt to further educate jurors 
on this matter is another method that may be tested. If it is found that individuals are 
unable to make decisions not influenced by these factors, even when they have a clear 
understanding of how the decisions should be made, then even the most eloquent and 
concise judicial instructions or the most intense voir dire will have no bearing on award 
decisions.
Upon further examination, it may be discovered that the courts are, in essence, 
asking jurors to do the impossible. If that is the case, less traditional methods of bias 
reduction, must be sought out and tested. One such less traditional method would be to 
assign separate juries to make each type of award decision with each jury being given
only the information that they are legally allowed to consider in making their decision. In 
addition, it may be found that the best way to eliminate or control for the bias may be to 
collapse the compensatory and punitive damage awards into a single type of damage 
award in which all o f the pertinent factors may be considered.
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Case Scenario 
The following excerpt provides information about a civil court case. Please read the 
information carefully and answer the questions that follow.
Richard Davis, a 43 year-old contractor, was doing business at Maxwell’s 
Hardware. As he was comparing items from an upper shelf, several shelves collapsed on 
Mr. Davis, resulting in severe and permanent injuries. As a result of the accident, Mr. 
Davis, who previously earned about $40,000 per year, incurred $15,000 in medical bills 
and now has difficulty working. Thus, Mr. Davis brought a lawsuit against Maxwell’s 
Hardware.
Maxwell’s Hardware is owned by the defendant [corporation], Mr. Charles 
Maxwell [Maxwell Corporation], Safety studies have been conducted to determine the 
maximum weight that can safely be placed on the shelves. Mr. Maxwell [The 
corporation] adhered to [ignored] the maximum weight limits and did not [routinely] 
overloaded] the shelves. In addition, Mr. Maxwell [the corporation] performed periodic 
[has never performed any type of] safety checks to ensure that the shelves were safely 
mounted.
Levels of Instruction
Pattern Instructions
Judge s Instructions: I will now instruct you on the law you must follow in reaching your 
decision. The defendant has been found liable for the injuries sustained by Mr. Davis. It 
is now your responsibility to award Mr. Davis such sum as you find will fairly and justly 
compensate him for any damages he sustained as a direct result of the defendant’s 
negligence.
In addition to any damages which you find Mr. Davis entitled, you may, but are 
not required to, award Mr. Davis an additional amount as punitive damages if you find it 
is appropriate to punish the defendant or to deter defendant and others from like conduct 
in the future. Whether to award plaintiff punitive damages, and the amount of those 
damages, are within your discretion.
Expanded Instructions
Judge’s Instructions: I will now instruct you on the law you must follow in reaching your 
decision. The defendant has been found liable for the injuries sustained by Mr. Davis. It 
is now your responsibility to award Mr. Davis such sum as you find will fairly and justly 
compensate him for any damages he sustained as a direct result of the defendant’s 
negligence. The sole purpose of these damages is to make Mr. Davis whole again or 
return him to his state prior to the accident. This type of damages is not to be used to 
punish the defendant. For this reason, you may consider only the extent of Mr. Davis’ 
needs and injuries and how these injuries will affect the remainder of his life. You may 
not take into consideration any characteristics of the defendant.
In addition to any damages which you find Mr. Davis entitled, you may, but are 
not required to, award Mr. Davis an additional amount as punitive damages if you find it 
is appropriate to punish the defendant or to deter defendant and others from like conduct 
in the future. Whether to award plaintiff punitive damages, and the amount of those 
damages, are within your discretion. This type of damages is meant to punish and deter 
and in making this award, you may take into account conduct and characteristics of the 
defendant. However, the purpose of these damages is not to further compensate the 
plaintiff so you should not consider the plaintiff s needs or injuries.
Expanded Instructions with Reprehensibility Example
Judge’s Instructions: 1 will now instruct you on the law you must follow in reaching your 
decision. The defendant has been found liable for the injuries sustained by Mr. Davis. It 
is now your responsibility to award Mr. Davis such sum as you find will fairly and justly 
compensate him for any damages he sustained as a direct result of the defendant’s 
negligence. The sole purpose of these damages is to make Mr. Davis whole again or 
return him to his state prior to the accident. This type of damages is not to be used to 
punish the defendant. For this reason, you may consider only the extent of Mr. Davis 
needs and injuries and how these injuries will affect the remainder of his life. You may 
not take into consideration any characteristics of the defendant, such as the defendant s
assets, ability to pay, or the offensiveness of the defendant’s conduct.
In addition to any damages which you find Mr Davis entitled, you may, but are 
not required to, award Mr. Davis an additional amount as punitive damages if you find it 
is appropriate to punish the defendant or to deter defendant and others from like conduct 
in the future. Whether to award plaintiff punitive damages, and the amount of those 
damages, are within your discretion. This type of damages is meant to punish and deter 
and in making this award, you may take into account conduct and characteristics of the 
defendant. However, the purpose of these damages is not to further compensate the 
plaintiff so you should not consider the plaintiff s needs or injuries.
Expanded Instructions with Corporate/Individual Example
Judge’s Instructions: I will now instruct you on the law you must follow in reaching your 
decision. The defendant has been found liable for the injuries sustained by Mr. Davis. It 
is now your responsibility to award Mr. Davis such sum as you find will fairly and justly 
compensate him for any damages he sustained as a direct result of the defendant’s 
negligence. The sole purpose of these damages is to make Mr. Davis whole again or 
return him to his state prior to the accident This type of damages is not to be used to 
punish the defendant. For this reason, you may consider only the extent of Mr. Davis’ 
needs and injuries and how these injuries will affect the remainder of his life. You may 
not take into consideration any characteristics of the defendant, such as the defendant’s 
assets, ability to pay, or whether the defendant is an individual or a corporation.
In addition to any damages which you find Mr. Davis entitled, you may, but are 
not required to, award Mr. Davis an additional amount as punitive damages if you find it 
is appropriate to punish the defendant or to deter defendant and others from like conduct 
in the future. Whether to award plaintiff punitive damages, and the amount of those 
damages, are within your discretion. This type of damages is meant to punish and deter 
and in making this award, you may take into account conduct and characteristics of the 
defendant. However, the purpose of these damages is not to further compensate the 
plaintiff so you should not consider the plaintiffs needs or injuries.
Questionnaire
Please answer the follow opinion items.
1. What is your opinion of the defendant?
Very 1 2 3 4 5
Negative
7
2. How offensive was the behavior of the defendant?
Very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Negative
3. How foreseeable was this accident?
Very
Positive
Very
Positive
Veiy 1 2  3 4
Foreseeable
7
4. How thorough were the precautions taken by the defendant?
Very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Thorough
Not At
A ll Foreseeable
Not At 
All Thorough
5. How would you rate the defendant’s ability to pay the awarded amount?
6 7 8 9Very 1 2 3 4 5
Able
Not At 
All Able
6. How likely is it that the awarded amount will cause a financial hardship for the 
defendant?
Very 1 2 3 4 5
Likely
7
7. How suspicious are you of persons who sue^
Very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Suspicious
Please answer the following demographic questions.
8. Sex: Male _____
Female
Not At 
All Likely
Not At
All Suspicious
9. Race: White/Non-Hispanic
White/Hispanic 
Hispanic/Black 
Black 
Other
10. Age: 18-29_____ 50-59
30-39_____  60+
40-49
11. Marital Status. 1. never married
2. divorced
3. married
4. widow/ widower
12. Education Level 1. less than high school graduate
2. high school graduate
3. some college
4. college degree
5. post-graduate college work or degree
13. Employment Status: 1. F u ll-T im e______  3. Retired
2. Part-Time   4. Unemployed
14. Occupation: 1. Laborer   5. Professional
2. Sales 6. Student
3. Service _ 7. Unemployed
4. Clerical 8. Retired
15. Aside from your political affiliation, how would you evaluate your political views?
1. Liberal   3 Somewhat conservative _____
2. Somewhat liberal _____  4. Conservative --------
16. Please indicate your annual family income
under $15,000_____  $15,001-$30,000_____  $30,001-$45,000
$45,001-$60,000 _____  $60,001-$70,000_____  Above $71,000 _
17. Have you ever served on a civil or criminal jury?
1. Yes, Civil
2. Yes, Criminal
3. No, Never
18. Have you ever been a party in a lawsuit?
1. Yes, I have sued someone
2. Yes, I have been sued
3. Yes, I have both sued someone and been sued
4. No, I have never been involved
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